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A MERLEAU-PONTIAN PERSPECTIVE
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Abstract. This article discusses the concepts of humanism and posthuman-
ism from a Merleau-Pontian perspective. The Phenomenology of Perception 
contains a humanistic point of view, since the world and other beings are seen 
from an egological and human perspective. Merleau Ponty’s later works, instead, 
show a posthuman point of view, because of the notion of “flesh”: my body is 
made of the same stuff of the other bodies, so that they constitute a common 
being. Taking inspiration from this concept and from the notions of revers-
ibility and divergence, it is argued that Merleau-Ponty suggests a new way to 
conceive humanism. 
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ЧЕЛОВЕЧЕСКОЕ И ПОСТЧЕЛОВЕЧЕСКОЕ. 
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аннотация. В статье обсуждаются концепты гуманизма и постгума-
низма с позиции Мерло-Понти. «Феноменология восприятия» предполагает 
гуманистическую точку зрения, поскольку мир и другие существа рассма-
триваются с эгологической и человеческой перспективы. Поздние работы 
Мерло-Понти, напротив, демонстрируют постчеловеческое видение, так 
как содержат понятие «вспышки»: мое тело сделано из тех же вещей, что 
и другие тела, и поэтому составляют единое бытие. Утверждается, что, 
вдохновляясь данным концептом и отталкиваясь от понятий обратимо-
сти и дивергенции, Мерло-Понти предлагает новый способ понимания 
гуманизма. 
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Introduction
In this article I will focus on the relation between human and 
posthuman. In order to define what they mean, I will refer to the body, 
through which we approach the world. Starting from an egological per-
spective, which begins with my body as a Nullpunkt [8, § 18, p. 61–62], 
phenomenology interprets humanism as a view of the world through 
the perspective of the I. The latter refers to the others through the mo-
dality of transcendental intersubjectivity [6, § 59, p. 136], on which 
ethics, culture and society are grounded. In this way, humanism takes 
a privileged look on the outer world. However, this perspective is put 
into crisis by posthumanism, which questions the primacy of humans 
and their separation from other beings [4, p. 7–20]. I will take inspira-
tion from posthumanism, opening to a new foundation of humanism. 
The latter is approached from a Merleau-Pontian point of view, ac-
cording to which human body constitutes subjectivity. However, in his 
later writings, the author theorizes the body as the flesh of the world 
[11, p. 144], pointing out the connection between ourselves and what 
surrounds us, other bodies and objects. Being a new humanist means 
to find the ambiguities of our boundaries and to focus on the contact 
between human and non-human bodies, which are different, but made 
of the same “stuff”. 
1. Merleau-Ponty as a humanist
Husserlian phenomenology is a form of humanism. It is an egology, 
since the human I is at the center of every process. After the phenomeno-
logical epoché, which parenthesizes the belief in the existence of an outer 
world, I am aware that everything is here for me [7, § 27, p. 51]. There 
is a “phenomenological residuum” [Ibid., § 33, p. 65], a pure sphere 
of consciousness, the transcendental I, an egological structure found-
ing the empirical egos. This structure is not empty, but has a content, 
the cogitationes [6, § 14, p. 31], which constitute pure life and depend 
on our being in the world. According to Heidegger, phenomenological 
reduction refers to our “being thrown” (geworfen) [5, § 39, p. 175]. This 
concerns the individual as such, as a unity of body, soul, and spirit, as 
situated in the world [Ibid., § 79, p. 387]. 
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In order to deepen this point, I will refer to Husserl’s idea of body: 
it is both a physical body (Körper) and a living body (Leib) [7, § 33]. 
The latter includes the former, however it is not a thing among things, 
but is bond to the soul [Ibid., §§ 35–42]. Sensations located in my limbs, 
on my head, etc. do not belong to the material body, but to my body. 
The Leib is the center of my perceptions, a center of reference and orienta-
tion, which puts me in relation to everything else [Ibid., § 18, p. 61–62].
Merleau-Ponty, referring to Husserl’s Nullpunkt, states that my 
body is “my point of view upon the world” [10, p. 73] and, according 
to a phenomenological perspective, reality is what appears to my body, 
since “I am my body” [Ibid., p. 151]. Merleau-Ponty is a humanist, since 
he thinks that reality is conceived only through the human body. This 
does not concern an isolated subject: 
The phenomenological world is not pure being, but rather the sense that 
shines forth at the intersection of my experiences and at the intersection 
of my experiences with those of others through a sort of gearing into each 
other. The phenomenological world is thus inseparable from subjectivity 
and intersubjectivity [Ibid., p. lxxxiv].
The phenomenological world comes out from the intersection of ex-
periences, from my interiorization of the other person’s experience and 
his or her interiorization of mine. It is a cultural world, a human world. 
Phenomenology is constituted on relations [3, p. 571–573], since every 
object is seen from a subjective and intersubjective point of view: my 
relation to the object is constituted through a common perspective. 
The starting point of these experiences is consequently human.
2. Merleau-Ponty as a posthumanist
Even if the Phenomenology of Perception supports humanism, it 
contains insights on posthumanism, which takes shape in Merleau-Ponty’s 
later works [1, p. 189]. First, there is a detachment from Husserl’s pure 
consciousness: “the body is the vehicle of being in the world and, for 
a living being, having a body means being united with a definite milieu, 
merging with certain projects, and being perpetually engaged therein” [10, 
p. 84]. Expressions such as “being united,” “merging,” “engaged” refer to 
the strict bond between the body and the world where it is located and acts. 
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This view is reinforced by the concept of ambiguity [10, p. 87], which could 
be considered as a key to a posthumanistic reading. First, subjectivity is 
opaque to its self-intuition, since it cannot shape a clear thought, without 
expressing it [Ibid., p. 182]. Secondly, the subject and the object are not 
always distinguished. The boundary between the Leib and the Körper may 
sometimes seem blurred. According to Husserl, it happens when I try to 
feel my body: if I touch my left hand with my right hand, the former should 
be the object and the latter the subject, but the touched hand perceives its 
being touched and feels itself as touching, whereas the touching hand is 
perceived as touched [6, § 44, p. 97]. The Leib turns into Körper and vice 
versa. Merleau-Ponty also refers to the ambiguity of the relation between 
the body and the soul: they have two different functions, but the one cannot 
be distinguished from the other [10, p. 517].
Ambiguity and being in the world are deepened in The Visible and 
the Invisible. Here the author does not translate Leib with “phenomenal 
body” or “one’s own body,” but with “flesh” (chair). The latter is not 
only my body, but “the body,” not just an expression of subjectivity, but 
also of objectivity: there are no specific boundaries of the flesh, which 
becomes the “flesh of the world” [11, p. 144]. The flesh is a chiasm, 
an intertwining between touching and touched, sentient and sensible, 
subject and object: there is a reversibility between the two terms [Ibid., 
p. 139]. This chiasmatic way of thinking wipes out the dualism between 
subject and object and gives way to a common ontological ground bring-
ing polarities together. The expressions “being united,” “merging,” and 
“engaged” now gain a new sense. 
How does it refer to posthumanism? According to the first principle 
of Pepperell’s Posthuman Manifesto, “humans are no longer the most im-
portant things in the universe” [12, n. 1]. Posthumanism opposes human 
perspective as a privileged one and sees other perspectives (belonging 
to animals, environment, AI, etc.) as equally important [9, p. 375–376], 
opening to a flat ontology. Since every kind of body is flesh and the flesh 
belongs to the world, every being is made of the same stuff: ontologi-
cally speaking, humans are not higher than animals, plants, or inanimate 
objects. 
According to the second principle of the Manifesto, “All techno-
logical progress of human society is geared towards the transformation 
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of the human species as we currently know it” [12, n. 2]. The flesh is 
seen in relation to hybridation: technological development, especially 
after the digital revolution, has gone further, bringing to devices (such 
as smartphones), extending our way to interact. These devices, which 
are now external, could be part of our bodies in the future, leading to 
a “hybrid intentionality” [13, p. 391]. Merleau-Ponty’s concept of chair 
helps us understand that such a hybridation is possible, since devices 
could be considered as extensions of our bodies, not as separate beings.
3. Merleau-Ponty as a new humanist
In his Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty thinks in a dual-
istic way: I am my body, the subject which approaches objects humanly. 
However, ambiguity undermines this rigid division. In The Visible and 
the Invisible, this concept is deepened through the idea of flesh, of a body 
which is not opposed to the world, the soul, and other beings, but is in a re-
lation of reversibility with them. The author also mentions “divergence” 
[11, p. 272]: the chiasm contains an intertwining between elements which 
are not the same. Their relation to one another allows reversibility, but 
not annihilation. Both elements have the same ontological value: they 
are equal, but not coincident. This concept becomes understandable 
thanks to Deleuze: “Being is the same for all these modalities, but these 
modalities are not the same. It is ‘equal’ for all, but they themselves are 
not equal” [2, p. 45]. What Deleuze writes about univocity, can be said 
about Merleau-Ponty’s flesh: it is a common concept of body, but single 
bodies are different from one another. My body is made of the same stuff 
of your body and we all participate to the body of the world, but my body 
does not coincide with yours.
Interpreting the late Merleau-Ponty, human beings are not ontologi-
cally different than other beings. I am not better than a horse, a tree, or 
a river. However, I am not a horse, a tree, or a river. Something similar 
could be said about hybridation: a digital prothesis could be a part of me 
and I could interact through it, but I am not a digital prothesis. I am 
something else, I am human.
My position is that humanism may exist without anthropocentrism, 
a humanism which could be more human than before, which is not afraid 
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to meet other perspectives and other bodies, to reconfigure itself through 
them. This kind of humanism could have ethical consequences, just as 
taking care of other beings and of our own bodies, without making them 
machines. The motto “stay human” assumes a new meaning through this 
new perspective, inspired by Merleau-Ponty’s suggestions. 
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